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Abstract 
On the 20th of April 2010, an outstanding explosion of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig situated in the Golf of Mexico 
caused the largest maritime disaster oil spill in the USA history and particularly caused considerable reputation and 
financial losses to BP.To deal with the spill oil as well as reputation and financial losses, the company particularly use 
many tactics and tools to communicate with stakeholders during and after the crisis. However, crisis management 
and communication experts’ opinions differed on whether BP crisis communication was effective or ineffective.This 
paper aims to assess BP crisis communication and mainly to point out possible failures through a content analysis of 
secondary data collected from various sources (newspapers, magazines, annual reports and blogs). 
Keywords: British Petroleum, Crisis communication, Crisis Management, Deepwater horizon. 
Introduction 
On the 20th of April 2010, the petroleum industry 
has been marked by the largest maritime disaster 
oil spill in its history known as the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill. This accident was caused by an 
outstanding explosion and has resulted in the 
killing of eleven people. Five months after the 
explosion and until the announcement of the 
completion of sealing of the oil well, some 780 
million gallons of crude leaked into the sea, 
causing the most considerable damages in the 
USA from an oil disaster, not only on the 
environment, but also on economy and on the 
regional tourism. The damages produced by this 
accident were also particularly considerable for 
BP. The company was facing simultaneously two 
main issues: the biggest spill oil in the US history 
and considerable financial and reputation losses.  
 
At the financial level, BP shares loosed on June 25, 
2010, nearly 7% and fell to its lowest level since 14 
years in the London Stock Exchange. In addition, 
the BP stock market valuation, which was $182 
billion on April 20, dropped to $ 89 billion on July 
2, 2010. As for the company’s reputation, it has 
dramatically collapsed not only in the U.S.A. but 
also worldwide. According to Covalence, an 
organization that tracks the ethical reputation of 
multinationals, BP’s reputation has fallen sharply 
as the spill has progressed without a resolution. 
BP was then awarded the grade E, the lowest 
grade attributed by Covalence in a ranking used 
by ethical investors. In addition, a PR Week/One 
Poll’s survey conducted about one month before 
the accident showed that the public feels that BP 
has not done enough to stop the leak. This 
reputation loss persisted till yet. Almost a year 
after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the “l2th 
Annual Harris Interactive U.S. Reputation 
Quotient (RQ) Survey,” (released on May 2 by 
research group Harris Interactive polled over 
30,000 Americans between December 
2010-February 2011) revealed that, among the 60 
most visible US companies, BP was second from 
last with a score of 49.82 and concluded that BP 
was still perceived by Americans as one of the 
companies with the worst corporate reputation in 
the USA [1]. 
 
Furthermore, BP faced growing calls for boycott of 
its products. In mid-June 2010, the number of 
Facebook group called “Boycott BP” grew to almost 
640,000 fans. An anonymous activist has joined 
the fun by establishing a fake BP Twitter account 
called @BPGlobalPR and started sending out 
messages about the Gulf oil spill to Twitter. A 
month after the explosion, @BPGlobalPR had 
190,035 followers while the BP account, 
@BP_America had only 18, 826 followers. At last, 
BP was facing thousands claims and lawsuits from 
many actors such as fishers, hotels, restaurants as 
well as NGOs like the Animal Welfare Institute 
(AWI) and other animal protection and  
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conservation organizations. To deal with the spill 
oil as well as reputation and financial losses, BP 
mobilized substantial means and expended a great 
deal of effort. The company particularly started up 
its communication machine in the hope to reduce 
and even to repair reputation damages. However, 
crisis management and communication experts’ 
opinions differed on whether BP has successfully 
or unsuccessfully communicate with its 
stakeholders during the crisis. The aim of this 
paper is to assess BP crisis communication 
relating to the Deepwater Horizon disaster and 
mainly to point out failures by using the existing 
models and theories related to crisis 
communication. The paper is organized as follow. 
After this first section dedicated to the background 
information, we present, in a second section, the 
theoretical framework, then we analyze and 
discuss, in a third section, the BP case study 
results, and finally, we draw conclusions in a 
fourth section. 
Theoretical Framework 
Following the multiplication and acceleration of 
crisis during the last decades, crisis management 
is viewed nowadays as a critical function for an 
organization, because failure in managing a crisis 
can result in serious harm to the stakeholders, 
losses for an organization, or even end its 
existence.In particular, researchers have shown 
an increased interest in crisis communication. 
Coombs [2] noted that crisis communication 
become an established corporate discipline in the 
last twenty years. Falkenheimer and Heide [3] 
considered it as the core of public relations practice 
and theory, while others underlined that it has 
been one of the three main areas of public relations 
research in the last two decades [4]. 
Crisis Communication Defined 
Crisis is an event that suddenly occurs, demands 
quick reaction and interferes with organizational 
performance [5] because it brings, or has the 
potential for bringing, an organization into 
disrepute and imperils its future profitability, 
growth, and possibly its survival [6].Indeed, 
during crises, people seek to find order in the 
chaos, in the sens that they seek to make sense of 
what is happening around them [7] and crisis 
communication plays a central role in effective 
crisis management. Crisis communication was 
defined by many researchers in different ways. 
According to Gray [8], crisis communication is 
related to managing the outcome, impact, and 
public perception of a crisis. Williams and 
Treadaway [9] defined crisis communication as the 
organization’s response to a  crisis situation in an 
attempt to diminish damage to the corporate  
 
image, while Hale et al. [10] consider that crisis 
communication can be summarized as a process of 
information collection, information processing, 
decision making, and information distribution of 
data necessary to address a crisis situation to 
internal and external stakeholders. There is 
nowadays a broad consensus among theorists and 
practioners that crisis communication should be 
considered as an integrated in as well as a critical 
element of, the overall crisis management process 
[11] and that effective crisis communication is 
essential to maintaining a positive relationship 
with key stakeholders in times of crisis [12].In 
particular, crisis communication directly affects 
how the public perceives the organization during 
and after the crisis [9]. In addition, factors such as 
globalization, rapid development of new 
communication and information technologies as 
well as social media expansion have dramatically 
changed the way information and communication 
is transmitted in times of crises. Consequently, 
risks are nowadays very high during and after a 
crisis occurs and crisis images, stories and 
spreading misinformation tend to move faster and 
faster. Crisis communication plays nowadays a 
central role in effective crisis management and 
have then increased in importance in the last 
decades. It’s also noteworthy that, there is at least 
two conception of crisis communication 
approaches. Some authors view crisis 
communication as a reactive function [6] [13], 
while others regard it as a long-term process and 
as a proactive function rather than a reactive 
function [14-17].As proponents of the reactive 
approach, Sturges et al [12] stated that crisis 
communication involves the interaction with 
stakeholders during the  “breakout stage of a 
crisis”. Lerbinger [6] also state that the majority of 
the communication   decisions have to be made 
when the crisis takes place. 
 
In contrast, supporters of a proactive crisis 
communication approach, argued that 
organizations will be more prepared to manage 
and resolve a crisis if effective communication 
systems are in place before the crisis occurrence 
and stakeholder relationships and credibility have 
been built prior  to the crisis [15]. Also, Ulmer et al 
[13] consider that crisis communication is 
essential to manage the pre-crisis phase and wrote 
that “effective crisis communication starts long 
before a crisis hits an organization and should be 
part of every organization’s business and strategic 
plans”. The authors also underline the importance 
of crisis communication in the post-crisis phase 
when he wrote that “after a crisis, organizations  
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should provide information to stakeholders but 
should also schedule time to listen to their  
concerns and to answer their questions” Ulmer et 
al [13]. Lastly, Heath and Millar [16] specifies that 
proactive crisis communication fulfils two 
important functions: it should firstly anticipate 
possible crises and reduces their occurrence 
probability, and should secondly, prepares key 
stakeholders for a crisis in order to ensure the 
crisis will be controlled when it occurs.    
Effective Crisis Communication Models 
Many crisis communication theorists have 
suggested theoretical models for an effective crisis 
communication (eg, Lee, [18]), but the theory of 
image restoration [19] as well as the Situational 
Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) developed 
by Coombs and Holladay [20] are by far the most 
used theories in this field. Lee [17] identifies six 
major communications strategies that companies 
can adopt when facing to a crisis. The first strategy 
called “shifting blame” consists of claiming that 
others are responsible for the crisis. The second 
strategy labeled “minimization” is to claim that 
the consequences of the crisis are not as bad as 
have been portrated. The third strategy, called “no 
comment” relates to refusal to comment. The 
fourth strategy “apology” is made through a verbal 
apologetic statement. The fifth strategy labeled 
“compensation” involves giving monetary 
compensation to victims, and the sixth strategy 
called “corrective action” promotes actions taken to 
prevent the reoccurrence of the same problem. The 
theory of image restoration [18] is built to help 
managers to preserve an organization positive 
image through communication. Although it’s not 
initially dedicated to crisis communication, 
researchers assume that it could be useful in this 
field because crises generate negative perceptions 
among stakeholders about the organization which 
affect its image and reputation. The theory focuses 
on the content of crisis communication messages 
and suggest five main image restoration strategies 
namely Denial, Evade responsibility, Reduce 
offensiveness, Corrective action and Mortification, 
with fourteen additional options or tactics. Applied 
to the crisis management field, the first and the 
second strategies (Denial and Evade 
responsibility) are seen as ways to deny or reduce 
the responsibility of the organization. The third 
and fourth strategies (Reduce offensiveness and 
Corrective action) are to be used in order to reduce 
the perception of damage caused by the crisis. The 
fifth strategy (Mortification) is to be used to ask 
forgiveness and expressing remorse. The 
Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) 
initially developed by Coombs and Holladay [19] is 
also among the most used theories in the crisis  
 
communication field. Noting important variations 
in crisis, the authors suggested a more refined 
typology of crisis situations and a “repertoire” of 
ten crisis-response strategies. Indeed, the authors 
classified crisis into thirteen crisis types and 
grouped them into three clusters (the victim, the 
accidental and the preventable). Each of the crisis 
type in a cluster shares a similar level of crisis 
responsibility with the others [19]. These crisis 
types produce strong attributions of crisis 
responsibility, and thus, represent a severe 
reputational threat to an organization. The SCCT 
also assumes that each crisis generates particular 
attributions of crisis responsibility, the degree to 
which the organization is perceived to be 
responsible for the crisis event [2]. The theory is 
further concerned with the historic behavior of the 
organization indicated by the company’s 
performance history formed by both the company’s 
crisis history and its stakeholder’s relationship 
history. The SCCT particularly argues that a 
negative performance history intensifies the 
reputational damage of the crisis type and 
suggested ten (10) crisis response strategies, 
grouped into three postures 1  namely the “deny 
posture”, the “diminish posture” and the “deal 
posture” [2]. It’s essential to note that both image 
restoration theory [1] and SCCT [9] adopted 
predominantly a reactive crisis communication 
approach.  
 
These theories show what would be done to protect 
and to repair damaged image and reputation 
during crisis as well as inthe post-crisis phase. 
Apart from these models, some scholars and 
experts have recently suggested lists for crisis 
communication best practices [21-23].  
 
Covello [11] suggested a checklist of best practices 
that should be included in any public health risk 
and crisis communication plan namely, (1) Accept 
and Involve Stakeholders as Legitimate Partners,  
(2) Listen to People, (3) Be Truthful, Honest, 
Frank, and Open, (4) Coordinate, Collaborate, and 
Partner with Other Credible Sources, (5) Meet the 
Needs of the Media, (6) Communicate Clearly and 
with Compassion and (7) Plan Thoroughly and 
Carefully. 
 
Bernstein [20] suggestes 10 steps to implement 
crisis communications within the organization, 
and notes that the first seven steps should be 
undertaken before crisis occurs. The ten steps are 
respectively, (1) Identifying the crisis 
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spokespersons, (3) Spokespersons Training, (4) 
Establishing  notification systems, (5) Identifying  
and knowing stakeholders, (6) Anticipating crises, 
(7) Developing holding statements, (8) Assessing 
the crisis situation (9) Identifying key  messages 
and (10) Riding out the storm. Lastly, and on the 
basis of the results of a crisis communication 
experts panel within the context of large 
publicly-managed crises, Seeger [22] suggestes the 
following ten best practices for effective crisis 
communication: (1) Process Approaches and Policy 
Development, (2) Pre-Event Planning, (3) 
Partnerships with the Public, (4) Listen to the 
Public’s Concerns and Understand the Audience, 
(5) Honesty, Candor, and Openness, (6) 
Collaborate and Coordinate with Credible Sources, 
(7) Meet the Needs of the Media and Remain 
Accessible, (8) Communicate with Compassion, 
Concern, and Empathy, (9) Accept Uncertainty 
and Ambiguity, (10) Messages of Self-Efficacy. 
Analysis & Discussion 
Because of the subject sensitivity and the fact that 
BP managers will be particularly reluctant to give 
out accurate information about some issues such 
as BP safety procedures and policies, as well as the 
real objectives of BP crsis communication 
strategies, secondary data was collected from 
various sources, specifically newspapers and 
magazines, BP sustainability annual reports and 
blogs. It is noteworthy that in order to ensure the 
validity of the data, we used only trustworthy 
newspapers and magazines. The collected data 
was content-analyzed through a grid drawn from 
our theoretical framework. As we assume, in 
accordance with the SCCT Theory, that the 
company’s negative performance history 
intensifies the reputational damage resulting from 
the crisis and could then affects the crisis 
management and communication decisions when 
the crisis occurs, this section will be decomposed 
into two sub-sections, the first describes the BP 
crisis history while the second one listed the main 
failures in the BP crisis communication.  
The BP Crisis History 
Even prior to the Deepwater horizon disaster, BP 
was familiar with disasters and scandals and has a 
long history of safety negligence particularly in the 
United States. In December 1965, the BP oil rig 
Sea Gem collapsed while it was being moved and 
thirteen crew died. On March 23, 2005, BP’s Texas 
City Refinery exploded and caught fire. Fifteen 
workers have died and more than 170 others have 
been injured. BP was then subject to lawsuits from 
the victims’ families and was charged with 
criminal violations of federal environmental laws. 
One year later, following an oil spill in Alaska, BP  
 
discovered extensive pipeline corrosion and faced 
serious operational issues. The company also paid 
about $ 20 million as environmental fines. 
 
Consequently, the group has tried to differentiate 
itself from its competitors by displaying a greater 
environmental awareness. In 2000, the group 
renamed itself “Beyond Petroleum” instead of 
“British Petroleum” and adopted a new logo 
featuring the green and yellow sunburst. The 
group launched an advertising and public 
relations campaign that reached $ 200 million. 
Thanks to this campaign, BP brand awareness 
jumped from 4 per cent in 2000 to 67 per cent in 
2007 and the company has been praised by the 
consumer business press and awards shows as a 
model of credible corporate social responsibility. In 
addition, a customer survey conducted in 2007 
revealed that among companies operating in the 
oil sector, BP had by far the most environmentally 
friendly image. In the same year, the BP campaign 
won the Gold Award from the American Marketing 
Association. 
 
BP also tried to positioned itself as a company 
fighting the climate change by promoting the 
renewable energy activities (including biofuels, 
hydrogen, solar and wind power). According to a 
report analyzing the Climate Change Strategies of 
the top 100 global companies published by the 
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible 
Economies (CERES) on Mars 2006 [6], BP was the 
leader and had the top score in a ranking of 100 
Global Companies. BP was also among pioneer 
companies that begun to publish an annual 
sustainability report in order to communicate their 
sustainability strategy to their stakeholders.  
 
It’s also noteworthy that BP was many times cited 
as the worst or among the worst companies 
operating in USA in relation to some 
environmental or social aspects. In 1991, the U. S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) cited BP 
as the most polluting company in the US based on 
its toxic release data. Corp Watch listed BP as one 
of the ten worst corporations of 2000 [24]. Mother 
Jones Magazine, an investigative journal, named 
BP as one of the ten worst corporations in both 
2001 and 2005 based on its environmental and 
human rights records. The Texas Public Interest 
Research Group claimed, in a 2004 analysis, that 
3,565 accidents happened in BP’s U.S. chemical 
plants and refineries between the period 1990 and 
2004, making the company number one in 
accidents in the nation. Elder [14] considered that 
BP’s operations in the United States have the 
worst safety record in the industry. 
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Last but not least, BP was cited in the press as one 
of the biggest spenders on lobbying in the oil and 
gas industry. Between 2004 and 2010, BP has 
spent a total of $625 million to represent its 
interests in Washington. In 2009, BP was 
suspected to use nearly $16 million to lobby US 
Congress in order to block attempts to regulate 
stricter safety. 
The BP Crisis Communication Failures 
In the light of our theoritical framework, seven 
failures, at least, should be highlighted. The first 
one concerns the pre-event planning. In fact, the 
deepwater horizon disaster is a tangible proof that, 
prior to the crisis, the BP environmental strategy 
was just a Green washing. Indeed, BP has never 
embraced a culture of safety, has never envisaged 
an emergency plan, was not prepared to deal with 
a such situation and did not make enough efforts 
to avoid crises. Furthermore, investigations 
conducted after the accident demonstrated that BP 
cut corners in days before the accident and 
neglected serious warnings few days before the 
accident.  
 
In particular, it is clear that BP has not prepared a 
crisis communication plan. As a matter of fact, the 
former BP CEO Tony Hayward recognized in an 
interview to Money Program on BBC 2 that “BP’s 
contingency plans were inadequate” and that BP 
“was not prepared” for the  Gulf oil disaster and 
was “making it up day to day” in the early stages. 
He also said that BP was not prepared to deal with 
the intense media scrutiny over the Gulf oil 
disaster and that he felt he was “demonized and 
vilified”. 
 
The second failure is related to expressing concern 
and empathy to the accident victims as well as 
other stakeholders.  
 
In fact, although the initial messages made by a 
company when a crisis occurs should significantly 
influence public opinion about the crisis as well as 
the organization’s handling of the event [18], BP 
was neither quick, nor accurate and consistent in 
responding to the accident; consequently, its initial 
response and messages generated a lot of harm to 
its image and reputation. 
 
Indeed, BP was accused of being too slow to 
acknowledge the problem initially as well as and of 
did not respond quickly enough. The company took 
four days to realize that the well itself was leaking. 
The company was particularly slow to express 
concern, compassion and full apology to victims 
which are most immediately affected by the spill.  
 
 
BP rather tried to blame third parties and 
abdicated responsibility while it would express 
concern for the victims and take its responsibility 
and reassure all the stakeholders.  
 
In the initial response phase, BP should have 
provided information and should have taken 
actions that might help affected people to cope 
psychologically and physically with the crisis [2]. 
It was better to take its responsibility, to reassure 
victims and specifically to begin by expressing 
concern for the victims of the crisis which could 
reduce the negative effects of the crisis. Focusing 
on its image to the detriment of victims and 
stakeholders, was the third BP crisis 
communication failure. 
 
To repair reputation damages, BP launched 
immediately after the accident, a vast public 
relations campaign. The company began running 
apologetic ads in early June, showing Hayward 
apologizing for the disaster and taking “full 
responsibility for cleaning up the spill in the  
Gulf”.  BP also launched a print ads campaign in 
US newspapers like The New York Times, the 
Wall Street Journal, USA Today and The 
Washington Post. This ads campaign was widely 
criticized by many stakeholders and even by the 
President Barack Obama, who considered that the 
money should have been spent on clean-up efforts 
and on compensating victims. More notably, the 
BP initial crisis communication was largely 
focused on legal concerns and resulted in denials of 
responsibility, minimization of the extent of 
damages and lack of useful information to 
stakeholders. 
 
The fourth failure relates to Spokesperson 
identification and preparation. When a crisis 
occurs, crisis leaders, especially spokesperson, 
have a central role in building and sustaining 
organization’s trust and credibility among 
stakeholders [25]. Also, in times of crisis, leaders 
and therefore spokesperson, must be able to 
communicate with all stakeholders and should be 
exceptional communicators [26].  
 
Because of his arrogance, negligence, its famous 
statements and particularly being not prepared to 
a crisis, former BP CEO has significantly 
contributed to BP loss of reputation. Instead of 
assuming its responsibility and expressing its 
compassion towards the victims, the BP former 
CEO Tony Hayward— as the company spokesman, 
had a series of mistakes during this crisis. He 
initially downplayed the spill and minimized its 
severity considering that “its environmental 
impact would likely be very modest” and that it is  
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“relatively tiny” in comparison with the big size of 
the ocean. He also told a news cameraman to “get 
out of there”, complained that he wanted his life 
back stating to reporter that “ There’s no one who 
wants this thing over more than I do, I’d like my 
life back”, and went to watch his yacht race while 
oil spews into the  Gulf. As a consequence, the 
former BP CEO has become the most hated man in 
the United States. 
 
As a matter of fact, BP announced on July 27th 
2010, that in October 2010, it would change its 
CEO Tony Hayward by the American Robert 
Dudley. Some experts had expected that a lot of 
Americans will be pleased to see an American 
person replacing the arrogant former CEO and 
that this would certainly help to restore the BP 
image. 
 
The fifth failure concerns the company’s 
stakeholders relationship and involvement in 
crisis management. In fact, prior to the disaster, 
BP has successfully established strong relations 
with some NGOs. It seems that the company was 
well aware that establishing such relations could 
give it more legitimacy as well as more credibility 
to its environmental discourse. Also, thanks to 
such strategy, the group wanted to hedge itself 
against NGO reaction in the case of accidents. 
Thanks to some BP giving (nearly $10 million in 
cash over the years), the Nature Conservancy, 
listed BP as one of its business partners and gave 
it a seat on its International Leadership Council. 
Also, after the Deepwater Horizon accident, some 
of its members begun to questioning about this 
partnership and called to review it. By the way, 
the Conservation International NGO, another BP 
partner on a number of projects and which 
accepted $2 million in donations from BP over the 
years, announced that it was reassigning its ties to 
the oil company in the wake of the massive Gulf 
spill. 
 
In addition, once the crisis occurred, BP seemed to 
prioritize on shareholders and investors. Early 
July 2010, when the BP stock hit its lowest point 
since the mid-1990s and 50 percent of BP market 
capitalization was lost, BPs former CEO flew to 
Mideast and held talks with sovereign wealth 
funds in Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar, as well as 
in Singapore, in order to find a partner who might 
help BP to avoid the threat of a hostile takeover 
offer from its closest competitors. These visits 
aimed to reassure BP shareholders and investors 
as well as BP partners in Russia and Azerbaijan 
which had much concerns after the BP decision of 
selling assets. Besides, this trip immediately  
 
 
generated some enthusiasm in the market for BP 
shares. 
 
Fortunately, the company seems to be more aware 
that it should collect informations from a wide 
range of stakeholders, and that it has to continue 
to work in close dialog with them in order to reduce 
feeling of anger and blame, to reassure them, to 
understand how they perceive and feel about it 
after the crisis as well as to involve them in effort 
to repair reputation damages. Consequently, BP 
began through workshops with its influential 
stakeholders around the world (in London, 
Washington DC, New Orleans and Rio de Janeiro), 
to initiate a dialogue to find out what they expect 
from BP’s sustainability reporting [27]. More than 
40 stakeholders (including representatives of 
non-governmental organizations and community 
groups as well as academics, policymakers and 
investors) took part in these workshops which 
aimed to give BP a clear brief about what 
stakeholders want to know about its culture, 
plans, policies, processes and performance. The 
company already included a summary of the 
workshops findings in its 2011 sustainability 
report. In addition, BP has used a specialist 
market intelligence search engine to identify 
trends in public and stakeholder opinion about BP 
and to evaluate their potential to affect the 
company’s reputation. A meta-analysis was also 
provided of all the recent stakeholder’s research 
and dialogue BP had carried out or commissioned. 
 
The sixth failure refers to collaboration with 
media. Indeed, in times of crisis, a company must 
not ignore the central role of media because, 
during a crisis, the majority of the information 
stakeholders collect about organizations is mainly 
derived from the news media; therefore media 
coverage is an important feature of reputation 
management [28]. Consequently, as stated by 
Seeger [22], rather than viewing the media as a 
liability in a crisis situation, risk and crisis 
communicators should engage the media, through 
open and honest communication, and use the 
media as a strategic resource to aid in managing 
the crisis  
 
In order to control their exposure to the press, BP 
tried to censure, to limit and/or to delay the flow of 
informations to the public. Many reporters claimed 
that BP (with the complicity of the Federal 
Aviation Administration and the Coast Guard) 
refused access to planes carrying media. Others 
reported that the Coast Guard and BP threaten 
them with arrest for documenting oil spill. Even 
the reporters that were allowed to see Elmer’s 
Island were accompanied by a BP representative.  
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BP also included in workers contracts a clause 
prohibiting them and their deckhands from 
making “news releases, marketing presentation or 
any other public statement”. The seventh and last 
failure is related to the company truthfulness and 
honesty in times of crisis. 
 
It is noteworthy that prior to the crisis, BP had 
tried to build up an image of legitimacy and 
trustworthiness, but this does not help it during 
the disaster, because stakeholders realized that 
the BP environmental strategy was just a Green 
washing. Also, during and after the Deepwater 
Horizon accident, the BP communication lacks of 
truthfulness and honesty.  
 
In fact, when the crisis occurs, BP has initially 
underestimated the magnitude of the spill and 
minimized the oil leak into the Gulf of Mexico. One 
week after the explosion, BP claimed that only 
1,000 barrels were spilling daily but by the end of 
the week, the company revised it upward to 5,000 
barrels. Indeed, some scientists estimated, at the 
end of June, that 60.000 barrels were actually 
spewing into the Gulf. 
 
BP was also suspected to truck in sand to cover up 
the oil. Of course, BP denied the facts and stated 
that “at no time has clean sand been used to cover 
or bury oil or oiled sand” and that “Storms that 
have passed through the area have deposited sand 
on the beach and eroded it again exposing oil 
buried by sediments brought in by the weather”.  
 
In addition, a few days before killing the well, BP 
published its own investigations report about the 
incident. BP said that its engineers, contractor 
Halliburton and rig operator Transocean share the 
blame for the “complex and interlinked series of 
mechanical failures, human judgments, 
engineering design, operational implementation 
and team interfaces” that caused the accident. Its 
former CEO said that there was a “lack of rigor 
and quality of oversight of contractors”, that “a 
series of complex events, rather than a single 
mistake or failure” led to the accident and that it 
would be “surprising if the industry does not look 
afresh at the relationship with contractors”. This 
BP internal report was widely criticized by experts 
who considered that it “does nothing more than 
spread the blame”, as well as by BP partners 
Transocean and Halliburton. Transocean 
responded by describing the report as 
“self-serving” while Halliburton said that the BP 
report contained “substantial “errors.  
 
BP also purchased a number of search terms in 
order to direct each search queried about the Gulf  
 
oil spill to the BP site in order to focus user 
attention on the company clean-up effort. 
According to SearchEngineWatch.com, BP spent 
nearly $l Million a month between Google 
AdWords and YouTube advertising. BP was also 
very present in the major social networks like 
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Flicker. Even 
worse, BP published two manipulated and 
“photoshopped” photos and presented them to the 
public as “news” photos from the Gulf oil spill 
response effort. A few days later, BP officially 
admitted that members of its staff photoshopped 
the two photos posted on its Web site, and 
promised to stop this practice.Lastly, nearly one 
year after the accident, BP published its first 
post-disaster sustainability report [29-32]. The 
report acknowledged that the company was sorry 
for what happened, promised improvements and 
described how BP is changing. Unfortunately, the 
report doesn’t say how the disaster happened and 
how much damage was actually done to the 
environment, the economy and the people.  
 
Consequently, this report was widely criticized by 
many experts because they considered that it was 
just a “greenwashed report”. Indeed, the company 
refused to list any figures from 2010’s worst US 
environmental disaster and argued that “no 
accurate determination can be made or reported 
until further information is collected and the 
analysis, such as the condition of the blowout 
preventer, is completed” and that “We have not 
included any emissions from the Deepwater 
Horizon incident and the response effort due to our 
reluctance to report data that have such a high 
degree of uncertainty”. In addition, by comparing 
BP’s oil spill levels for 2006, 2008, and 2010, the 
report showed that 2010 had the lowest spillage of 
those three years (1.7 million litters, as opposed to 
2.2 and 3.4 million in the earlier years).  
 
The company said it couldn’t include the Gulf spill, 
because there has been “no accurate 
determination” of its size [28]. In conclusion, even 
after the crisis, BP continues to conceal important 
information about the real damages of the spill oil, 
disseminated only information that can contribute 
to repair its reputation and continues to blame its 
partners. Moreover, the succession of accidents 
and scandals indicate that BP has never believed 
that it could learn from such crisis [29-32]. 
Conclusion 
Four lessons could be learned from the analysis of 
failures in the Deepwater Horizon crisis 
communication.At first, this case study shows that 
as many companies, BP seems to ignore the role of 
crisis communication, before, during and after the  
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crisis. Specifically, BP seems to ignore that 
communication during the first hours of a crisis 
can have remarkable implications for the company 
image and brand, that almost 80% of a crisis 
management consists of communication and that 
much of a crisis lies not in its reality, but in its 
perception. Second, and during a crisis, 
Stakeholders want to feel informed, safe and 
connected when a crisis occurs, then, open timely 
and trustworthy reporting, as well as regular 
dialog and communication with all stakeholders 
should be insured before, during and after the 
crisis. The company should particularly be honest 
about what it knows and does not know, which 
would give it more credibility. Third, crisis 
communication should be viewed as a proactive 
function rather as an only a reactive one. In doing 
so, crisis communication will help crisis managers 
to anticipate possible crises, to reduce its 
occurrence probability, to be more prepared to 
manage and resolve a crisis when it happens, to  
 
prepare key stakeholders for the crisis and to build 
the company credibility before the crisis occurs. 
Fourth, as the proactive crisis communication 
approach involves proactive interaction with key 
stakeholders and generates solid trust and 
credibility, there is a big chance that such an 
approach will be more effective in post-crisis stage 
and would help the company to better restore and 
repair reputational damages. These findings 
should not hide few limitations of this research 
including those relating to the exclusive use of 
secondary data. The use of an experts’ panel could 
have increased our research validity. As for future 
research, we particularly suggest a further 
investigation of how crisis communication affects 
people by controlling the level of their attributions 
of crisis responsibility as well as the corporate 
commitment to CSR, its reputation and image. 
This would provide significant improvements to 
the existing crisis communication theories such as 
image restoration and the SCCT. 
References  
1. Harris Interactive (2011) The 2011 Harris Interactive 
Annual RQ Summary Report: A survey of the U.S. 





2. Coombs (2007) Crisis Management and 




3. Falkenheimer J, Heide M  (2006)   Multicultural 
crisis communication: Towards a social 
constructionist perspective.  J.  Contingencies and 
Crisis Management, 14(4):180-89.  
4. Ki EJ,Shin JH (2005)The Status Of Organization–P
ublic Relationship Research in Public Relations: 
Analysis of published articles between 
1985 and 2004. Paper presented at the 2005 Annual 
Conference of The International Communication 
Association, New York. 
5. Millar DP (2004)  Exposing the errors: An 
examination of the nature of organizational crises.In 
Millar  DP, Heath  R  L  (Ed.) Responding To Crisis: 
A Rhetorical Approach to Crisis Communication. 
(pp. 19-31) Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
6. Lerbinger O  (1997) The Crisis Manager: Facing Risk 
and Responsibility, Lawrence Elbaum Associates 
Publishers, New Jersey. 
7. Gray GM (2003) The risk communication challenge. 
Paper presented at the conference from  
 
cad Cow to acryl amide to listeria: The art of effective 
risk communication, Boston, MA. 
8. Williams DE, Treadway G (1992)  Exxon and the 
Valdez accident: A failure in crisis communication. 
Communication Studies 43:55-64. 
9. Hale JE, Dulek RE, Hale  DP  (2005)  Crisis response 
communication challenges: building theory from 
qualitative data. J. Business Communications, 
42(2):112-34. 
10. Coombs W T (1999)  Ongoing Crisis Communication: 
Planning, Managing and Responding. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
11. Fishman DA (1999) Valujet flight 592: Crisis 
communication theory blended and extended. 
Communication Quarterly, 47:345-375. 
12. Sturges DL, Carrell B J , Newsom  DA ,   Barrera M  
(1991)  Crisis communication management: The 
public opinion node and its relationship to 
environmental nimbus. SAM Advanced 
Management Journal, 56(3):22-27. 
13. Ulmer RR, Sellnow  TL ,   Seeger M W (2007) 
Effective crisis communication. Thousand Oakes: 
Sage Publications. 
14. Elder L (2005)   Group wants powerful acid out of 
BP’s plant, The Daily News, March 27, 2005. 
[Online] Available:  
http://galvestondailynews.com/story.lasso?ewcd=da2
67531b07af737. 
15. Fink S (1986)  Crisis Management Planning for the 




Available online at www.managementjournal.info 
Daniel De Wolf, Mohamed Mejri
 




16. Heath RL,   Millar  DP  (2004)  A rhetorical approach 
to crisis communications: Management, 
communication processes, and strategic responses. 
In R. L. Heath, & D. P. Millar (Eds.), Responding to 
crisis: A rhetorical approach to crisis communication 
(pp. 1–17). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
17. Lee BK  (2004) Audience-oriented approach to crisis 
communication: A study of Hong Kong consumers’ 
evaluation of an organizational crisis. 
Communication Research, 31(5): 600-618.  
18. Benoit WL (1995) Accounts, Excuses, Apologies: 
A Theory of  Image Restoration Strategies. Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press. 
19. Coombs WT, Holladay   S J   (2002) Helping crisis 
managers protect reputational assets: Initial tests of 
the situational crisis communication theory. 
Management Communication Quarterly, 16: 165-86. 
20. Bernstein J (2004) The 10 Steps of Crisis 
Communications. Crisis Response, prevention, 
planning and, Training, 106. [Online] Available:  
http://www. bernsteincrisismanagement.com/docs/ 
the_10_steps_of_crisis_communications. 
21. CovelloVT (2003)Best practices in public health risk
 and crisis communication. Journal of Health 
Communication Research, 8:5-8 
22. Seeger MW (2006) Best practice in crisis 
communication: An expert panel process. J. Applied 
Communication Research, 34(3):232-44. 
23. Mokhiber R, Weissman R (2005) The 10 Worst 
Corporations of 2005. Multinationalmonitor.org. 14 





















24. Schoenberg A (2005) Do crisis plans matter? A new 
perspective on leading during a crisis. Public 
Relations Quarterly, 50: 2-7.  
25. Seijts GH (2004) Walking on water or sinking 
without a trace? Six behaviors that describe strong 
crisis leaders. Ivey Business Journal, 69 (2):1-6. 





27. Carroll CE, Mc Combs ME (2003) Agenda-setting 
effects of business news on the public's images and 
opinions about major corporations. Corporate 
Reputation Review, 6(1):36-46. 





29. Coalition for Environmentally Responsible 
Economies (2006) Climate-Change-Strategies – 





30. Coombs W (2009) Conceptualizing Crisis 
Communication. In R. L. Heath, & H.D. O’Hair 
(Eds.). Handbook of crisis and risk communication. 
(pp. 100-119). New York: Routledge. 
31. Fearn Banks K (1996) Crisis communications: A 
casebook approach. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
32. Holmes W (2011) Crisis Communications and Social 
Media: Advantages, Disadvantages and Best 
Practices, in Proceedings of the 33rd Annual CCI 
Research Symposium, [Online] Available:   
http://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?articl
e=1003&context=ccisymposium 
 
